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Abstract
Differing motivations for design activity
are discussed as a basis for examining the
relationship between problem identification
and problem solving. Active rejection of
solution concepts in the early stages of
problem identification is advocated, and any
exhaustive formulation of complex problems
is considered impossible. The case for a
formal problem identification activity is pre-
sented, supported by observations on the
human tendencies towards unjustified
assumptions, inappropriate transfer of
experience, and diverse perceptions of the
world. It is concluded that since no single
universally correct definition of a complex
situation can exist, the task of policy makers
is to find an enabling basis for action.
In part 2 the nature of design problems
is discussed and it is suggested that the
resolution of discrepancy between 'what is'
and 'what ought-to-be' is a predominantly
technical task following the more funda-
mental processes of problem identification
and policy making, which define 'what is'
and 'what ought-to-be'. The basis of an
approach to problem identification is
described which encompasses the purposes
of intervention in situations perceived as
unsatisfactory. It appears that arbitrary
constraints help to maintain the humanity
of the man-made world.
Introduction:
Problem Push or Solution Pull?
There are two main, and often complemen-
tary, motivating forces underlying the
majority of design activity. One is the
drive for the satisfaction of identified
needs - from- basic needs such as shelter,
to emergent needs such as the reduction of
motor accidents or pollution. The other
seems to lie in man's continual striving for
the fulfilment of human potential - the
achievement of visions. It is rare that one
would find either entirely absent from
design activity but often it can be said that
one or the other dominates - consider the
difference in motivation between projects
such as mass housing and moon shots, or
between motorway crash barriers and
Concorde.
Whatever the motivation, it is interesting
to note that from the attempts to achieve
visions wi" emerge new needs; and the
satisfaction of existing needs will permit
new visions.
Perhaps not inappropriately the achieve-
ment of visions can often call upon far
greater resources than can the satisfaction
of needs. This is perhaps a manifestation
of man as a spiritual being, but is often
attacked. Perhaps such attacks overlook the
cumulative de-humanising effects of a needs-
oriented engineering approach to design.
Yet in the end there need not be any great
division, for the satisfaction of needs may
take place as part of a visionary process -
and indeed must if it is not merely to be a
reinforcement of the status quo.
We are, in this paper, going to be con-
cerned with needs and with visions because
when they become immediately relevant to
the designer they can both be dealt with as
particular kinds of problem. In short, we
are taking a pragmatic rather than a philo-
sophical view, in which the relative merits
of needs satisfaction or achievement of
visions as motives are not argued, but their
implications for problem identification and
design activity are assessed. These two
different motivations have been referred
to as PROBLEM PUSH and SOLUTION
PULL, and for brevity we will use these
terms hereafter.'
The Sources of Design Objectives
The objectives of any design activity must
be achieved within a context of resources,
organizations, laws and so on. These effec-
tively constrain the ability to meet given
objectives, but at the same time provide
the raw material and resources for change.
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267 So, in addition to any internal coherencewhich a designed artefact must have, it must
be compatible with its environment of
production and use. One could say that
any design must satisfy both internal and
external criteria in order to be successful.
In 'problem push' situations it is therefore
necessary to understand the context of
operation of any artefact the motivation
for which is to improve the conditions in
that operational context. Thus if one
was asked to design a safer motor car it
would be necessary to understand the
dangers which it is supposed to ameliorate or
eliminate - which means understanding the
conditions of its use, the physiological and
psychological capabil ities of its users, the
cost limits of producer and purchaser, etc.
In 'solution pull' situations one would
not necessarily expect great account to be
taken, by the visionary, of the constraints
pertaining in the existing situation. It is
nevertheless true that in such circumstances
the solution will, either through merit or
manipulation, have to create for itself a
supportive environment. For example, in
addition to the immense development costs
involved in Concorde, there will need to be
an operational environment created in order
for it to be a success. Thus governments
must make huge subsidies for its purchase
by airlines, laws must be altered and created,
crew must be specially trained, airfields re-
located and re-planned perhaps, and so on.
Here we see one of the differences in
consequence for the designer of differences
in the motivation for design. In 'problem
push' situations he has to seek close fit
between the artefact and the conditions
which generated the need for it. In 'solution
pull' situations he may have to seek realisa-
tion of the project in conditions unsuitable
or even conflicting with it, a circumstance
which will in itself be demanding on all
sorts of resources. There are far more
uncertainties, far more risks of failure,
and probably far more surprises of all kinds
in store. On the whole it might be said that
one of a designer's objectives should be to
make the introduction of his artefact
surprise free for its users, and of course this
is much more difficult with 'solution pull'
problems.
In both cases a designer's ability to
correctly interpret the present state of the
world is critical, as is his ability to predict
how his actions might change that state.
If he fails in either then the success of his
design will be compromised.2
First, Catch your Problem
Rittel3 has termed planning problems
'wicked' and design problems 'ill behaved'
because they have no unique solution,
cannot easily be defined or limited, depend
on value judgements and belief for their
resolution, and so on. Rittel's terminology
seems to imply an active and even mis-
chievous resistance to man's intervention.
The case is, however, that although such
problems are very complicated, they are
only 'wicked' when seen from the viewpoint
of a wish to exercise total control over their
resolution.
However, this is not to quarrel with
Rittel's observation that to treat such
problems as clear in cause and predictable
in outcome is a dangerous and misguided
practice. Most modern socio-technical
problems demand an approach very far
removed from the traditional deterministic,
fragmented and often simplistic approaches
of the past.
If we accept for the moment that the
kind of design problems in which we are
interested have no unique 'correct' answer,
we can logically conclude that they must
therefore have many potential answers.
One of the problems is therefore that of
choosing between alternative possibilities.
One criterion of choice is commonly provided
by the objectives for intervention in a situa-
tion. At the same time it is apparent that
much design work is carried out with little
or no formal identification of objectives
other than in terms of solution concepts.
Rittel maintains that all problems are
seen in terms of solution concepts. We do
not entirely agree as we will explain, but
practically speaking he is probably correct
for the traditional design disciplines. If a
client goes to an architect with a problem he
is likely to end up with a building solution.
The reason he went to an architect in the first
place was because he saw his problem in terms
of an architectural solution - otherwise he
might have gone to his bank manager. Having
been approached, the architect will reinforce
the likelihood that the problem will be seen
in architectural images because
a) of his conditioning through education
and experience;
b) his skills and strategies relate to archi-
tecture;
c) his fees are based on the costs of con-
struction.
Similarly, if a client goes to a mechanical
engineer for a clock he will get a mechanical
clock - draw your own conclusions on what
he will get from an electronic engineer and
a water engineer.
The flaw in all this is that there may be a
given type of clock which is ideal for the
client's purpose and another which is totally
unsuitable. Similarly a change in factory
working methods and some new equipment
may achieve more than will the expansion
of premises for an industrial client. The
mechanical engineer and the architect
represent resources from whom solutions
may be commissioned, but somewhere back
along the line some decisions have to be
made about just what the problem is. There
are assessments and policy decisions to
be made, and there is evidence to show
that to an important degree these assessments
can and should be made more or less inde-
pendently of reliance upon solution concepts.
Now for a factory or a clock these policy
decisions may well be made adequately by 268
the cIient body, but for cities, health services,
transport systems, housing policy, and so on
the task is not a personal but a public one.
As such it is subject to national goals and
inerests. This makes it more complex, more
varied, more cri~ical, and more political.
This is not to say that solution concepts
can be successfuly excluded, especially by
those unskilled in any other way of looking
at problems. However, we would go as far
as to say that active rejection of solution
concepts at the early stages of problem
identification is desirable in complex socio-
technical situations.4 Rittel says 'in order
to describe a wicked problem in sufficient
detail, one has to develop an exhaustive
inventory of all conceivable solutions ahead
of time'.5
This statement leads Rittel and Webber
down a path of impotency which results in
their unwillingness to make even tentative
proposals for dealing with those problems
which they see as wicked. They have, how-
ever, in some ways led themselves into a
trap. Because they conclude that 'tame'
problems can be fully and exhaustively
formulated, they 'logically' become con-
cerned with the problems of exhaustively
formulating 'wicked' problems. It is readily
apparent however that this is not possible.
This does not preclude us either from formu-
lating such problems, nor from acting upon
them. After all, politicians, economists and
taxi-drivers all take action in the face of
uncertainty, often with considerable success.
It is Rittel and Webber's apparent desire for
omnipotence which makes their position as
planners untenable.
It Must be Good, it Won a Medal
Design problems commonly have no clear
cut objectives, not because they could not
be devised, but because they often could not
be agreed upon. Furthermore it has not been
all that necessary to clarify objectives. There
269 has been a general belief that 'design','progress', 'improvement', 'redevelopment',
'slum clearance', etc., are all GOOD THINGS
in themselves. It has proved extremely
difficult for researchers to assess the success
of say, local authority housing schemes
because other than the general objective of
providing housing at a given cost per unit
there have been no objectives set up.
Imagine then the difficulties inherent in
more complex situations such as urban
renewal or national transport co-ordination
of trying to decide not only when you have
reached a satisfactory solution at the design
stage, but of evaluating the success of your
proposals after they have been implemented.
To see even better how important for the
designer is the setting up of clear and realistic
objectives in designing for complex situations,
we can refer back to our earlier discussion
on motivations for design.
In many cases, the designer is called upon
to change some, presumably unsatisfactory,
situation. Part of his effectiveness will be
perceivable by the extent to which the
unsatisfactory situation becomes more
satisfactory, and the nett value of the
improvement will in part be a function of
the relationship between that improvement
and the resources used to achieve it. Dis-
satisfaction with the outcomes of design
often lies in the feeling that the extent of
the improvement has not been worth the
cost of achieving it and since so much of
design practice is concerned with marginal
improvement, the critical relationship exists
between costs at the margin and the margin
of improvement.6 This means that in many
cases one can begin to make objectives firm
at some point of diminishing returns in the
investment of resources. Such a criterion is
of great importance in, for example, local
authority fund allocation where there are
far more demands upon resources than can
possibly be met. In large complex situations
this provides one of the determinants for
deciding upon the right scale or level of
satisfactoriness of a solution.
Thus the objectives for a project must be
clarified if such judgements of worth and
value are to be made in any way explicit.
In this way one is helped to decide upon the
appropriate design resources needed to meet
the levels of performance and predictability
selected, and can subsequently test the
success of the implemented solution by
reference to the objectives set. (Of course
it may have been that the objectives were
wrong or inadequate and again it is important
that they were explicitly identified in order
to contribute better ones next time).
This ability to evaluate the success of
measures taken is becoming increasingly
important at a time of world shortages,
stress and conflicting demands. Sponsors of
design activity expect that given methods,
approaches or techniques can actually
deliver the goods. How can this be proved?
The answer is that on the whole it cannot be
proved in the past practices and results of
design. Only the most subjective of responses
can be given - such as that the client is
satisfied, or that the design won a medal.
In the vast majority of cases one is unable
to say that a design has met or exceeded it;
objectives, because none were ever formally
identified. This applies to architecture, town
planning, industrial design, transportation
etc. There is something to be learned from
the newer areas of system design, operations
research and so on (but with caution of
course) .
To move on, we will see that the designer
has both a different basis and need for the
identification of objectives in situations
related to a vision, or a conviction, or a
desire, held by some body with the power
to at least begin to initiate its realisation
in the real world. Any objectives posed must
be far more tentative because they relate to
a non-existent state, possibly with few
reference points in the present. (In problem
push situations objectives will usually be
firmly rooted in present state referents).
Demolish all Schools!
The great difficulty is that there is no single
logical relationship between the goals of a
situation and its achievable objectives. To
illustrate this we can point out that the goal
of 'equal educational opportunity for all'
can be achieved in part by setting as an
objective the demolition of all schools.
It is a value judgement to try to achieve
the goal with the objective of building many
schools.
In 'problem push' situations one's goals
and values are usually accepted reference
points to which any objective agreed upon
implicitly relate. In 'solution pull' situations
one's vision probably challenges current
goals and values to some degree, but the
difficulty lies in choosing objectives which,
if achieved, will result in the valued goal
states. In the former case the objectives
can be established empirically, in the Jatter
only hypothetically.
Thus an important difference between
the objectives defined in the two conditions
is that one set is fi rm and the other tentative.
This is important because in the first situation
the designer fails if he fails to meet the
objectives; and in the second situation part
of his skill will lie in modifying the objectives
as he goes deeper into the conceptual and
technical problems of realization. It is fairly
well known in design that the structural
concepts (sol uti on images) wh ich one
develops to handle a problem, generate
qual ities and properties hitherto unperceived
in the situation for which one is designing.
Here we are introduced to the inter-active
process between problem identification
and solution generation mentioned at the
beginning of this paper.
Earlier we pointed out that we considered
it possible and desirable to resist solution
images in problem identification. The identi-
fication of objectives is not a PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION task, but lies at the
bridge between this process and that of
SOLUTION GENERATION. In fact it is
probably more critical to avoid premature
identification of objectives in incremental
change situations than in visionary situa-
tions. It doesn't really matter how people
have visions as long as they have them.
In situations which are unsatisfactory in
some critical way, however, an inadequate
identification of the problem may have
disastrous results. (Take for example the
vast Pruett-Igoe housing complex in
St Louis, U.S.A. The first tenants moved
into the planners' pride in 1954. 20 years
later the blocks were dynamited to rid the
city of a concentration of violence and
vandal ism). 7
Emergent Properties, Rally Winners
and Death Traps
We have already mentioned that the process
of design results in unexpected emergent
properties, which in some cases are not
just a bonus, but lift the concept from a
worthwhile one to a major influence. Thus
one finds that the British Leyland Mini
becomes a world leader in automotive design
and has qualities quite unplanned, such as its
racing and rallying performance. It is often
impossible for an observer to distinguish
whether or not a property or a design is an
emergent one or not - only the designer,
and perhaps his client knows - and often
they do not tell.
This phenomenon has been known as
'serendipity' or the art of making
beneficial discoveries by happy accident.
It is an important characteristic in all sorts
of fields of human activity besides design.
Whatever else we do to the design process
we must not reduce the chance of such
occurrences.
But the situation has its reverse. Just as
we can find that something which we have
designed has unexpected beneficial proper-
ties, so we can find that it has undesirable
or dangerous ones. We have a very 'good'
national traffic system within which about
30 people each day are killed and many in-
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271 jured. The Lockheed Starfighter has claimedthe lives in peacetime of over 200 West
German pilots during its operational service
with their air force. The most modern of
British zinc refining plants at Avonmouth had
to be closed down for weeks because it had so
poisoned the air and the Severn Estuary. You
can no doubt think of many other examples.
Thus we can observe that emergent
properties may be either beneficial or
detrimental, and part of the task of those
involved in design must be to control the
effects of these secondary properties so that
they do not so compromisp. the primary
functions of a design that it is rendered
unacceptable. One could find many suppor-
ters for the argument that this control has
failed for the motor car, urban centres, and
mass housing, to name but a few.
Analysis with Blinkers On
Many of the difficulties in making such
changes of approach to the early stages of
design as those we have been advocating are
rooted in the personal and inter-personal
capabilities of human beings in their role as
designers. We have pointed out that clients
and designers will tend to think in solution
concepts, partly because of their experience,
training and so on. We have said in effect
that the mental conditioning imposed by
such things acts as a constraint on the way
they see the problem.
Much of the work of Edward de BonoS
is concerned with this limitation on percep-
tion and understanding. He puts forward
the concept of lateral thinking as a way of
stepping outside the mental constraints of
experience, custom, tradition and ideology.
There are many examples capable of demon-
strating how our minds all too readily prevent
us from seeing other than a few facets or
possibilities in most situations. Some of you
may know the story of how Brunelleschi
landed the job of designing the duomo
for Florence Cathedral by exploiting his
capacity to look at problems in a more
divergent or exploratory manner. At best
here one can merely show a few party tricks
to help prove the point.
Connect all the dots with
4; straight lines without
removing the pen from the
paper.
Take four matchsticks and
lay them on the table. Use
them to make 5 squares
(without snapping them).
Some of you will 'see' the answer quickly,
and some will never get it without looking at
the answers at the end of the paper. Some of
you will be constrained by assumptions, and
others will use solution images from other
puzzles inappropriately.
It is possible, however, to adopt proce-
dures and train one's mind to step over the
mental blocks which inhibit new perception.
If such blocks are operational on such simple
situations as those given above imagine the
implications for really complex and humanly
significant problems.
If we commonly think in solution concepts
consider the differences occurring between
people from different backgrounds and
different cultures. When used well these
differences can be a rich source of ideas and
cross-fertilisation but they can also lead to
confusing and conflict-generating misunder-
standings within design and project teams.
It is now increasingly common for teams
to include members from many cultures.
A major civil engineering project may have
a West African government representative,
a West German technical consultant, a
Scandinavian designer and a financier from
the USA. Imagine the mess that could result
from all their implicit assumptions about
what each meant.
Of course, many such projects are realised
satisfactorily (we assume, with little evi-
dence) but on the other hand many far more
modestly diverse project groups find them-
selves with considerable problems resulting
from misunderstandings. Without some
recourse to formal problem identification
processes, the likelihood of missed potential
th rough unjustified assumptions, of partial
understanding through mental blocks and of
misinterpretation through diverse experience
and concepts, is so great as to be unaccept-
able in critical and complex problems. It is
not unfair to say that a great deal of design
begins by Analysis with Blinkers on.
Whilst in past times of much slower
change such procedures may have been less
risky, they are today quite unacceptable.
We are now in a situation where experience
quickly becomes out of date - which is not
to say that experience has no value but that
active steps must be taken to overcome the
tendency to treat this year's problem the
way you successfully treated last year's.
However, perhaps the most important
single influence upon the definition of
problems is the way the members of any
design team see their own role. We have
suggested that it may be an implicit desire
for omnipotence which leads Rittel and
Webber to see dynamic, complex planning
problems as 'wicked'. An alternative attitude,
which has the effect of producing a different
view of problems in general and in particular,
is to accept the natural justice of man's lack
of omnipotence. This means accepting that
the motivation for action - the source of
someone's interest in wishing to define a
problem - must constitute one reference
point by which the 'correctness' of the
problem definition itself may be judged.
It means accepting that no single universally
correct definition of a complex problem can
exist. Thus the major task facing design
policy makers is to find an enabling basis for
action.
In conclusion therefore we can say that
problem identification for design is important
1. Differing motivations for design action
change the nature of the design task and
the objectives which design seeks to meet.
2. Design problems in socio-technical systems
are continually changing and each one is
unique and ramified.
3. There is no single correct definition of or
answer to a design problem.
4. Traditionally, dependence on solution
concepts in defining problems has the
effect of restricting the scope for action
on the problem.
5. Objectives should be set up, not to justify
preconceived solutions, but in response to
the motives for change.
6. Man's experience causes him to im-
pose familiar patterns on unfamiliar
phenomena. This characteristic causes
perceptual myopia and subsequent mis-
judgements of the appropriateness of
solution ideas.
7. A designer's ability to interpret the
present state of the world is critical, as
is his ability to predict how his actions
might change that state. If he fails in
either then the success of his design will
be compromised.
Part 2
The Nature of Design Problems
The Problem 'as given' is Primitive
We've looked at the need for Problem
Identification in design, and we can now
develop our understanding of what this
might actually mean in practice, with the
aim of proposing what the characteristics of
a well formulated problem statement might
be.
First, we shall examine a typical approach
to a traditional single-disciplinary designer.
The first step is to express the need or desire
in terms of a solution concept. Thus typically
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273 a client may say: 'I want a new factory'.We may term this a PRIMITIVE PROB-
LEM STATEMENT. The normal response
of, in this case, the architect is to take the
PROBLEM AS GIVEN and begin to carry
out an analysis of it (with bl inkers on!).
He immediately places himself and his client
in a tightly bounded situation.
Of course the client will elaborate on the
basic statement but basically he will be
saying 'I want a factory'. Similarly clients
want rapid transit systems; monorails; auto-
matic coffee dispensers; new international
airports; industrialised housing systems and
so on.
All of these are solution concepts, all
of them are PRIMITIVE, and all of them
comprise the perfectly acceptable starting
point for a long tradition of design practice.
Today, however, we can and do question
whether mass housing is the right answer
to the housing needs of people; whether
another international airport is actually
necessary; whether a tea lady might be
preferable to a coffee dispenser; whether
monorails aren't just as inflexible as other
tracked systems; and so on.
Now when we ask the question 'What do
you want?' we don't mean 'How do you see
the answer to what you want?'. We mean
'What are the things which are happening
which suggest to you that some action for
change is necessary and why have you come
to me?'. It's much more of a mouthful, and
indeed it is much more serious. It is more
serious because it is more difficult to answer
such a question. Furthermore the employ-
ment structure of designers makes them
reluctant to help a client realise that he may
not need them after all.
To conclude this point we can say that,
particularly in complex systems and stressed
design environments the Problem as Given
must be treated as a PRIMITIVE PROBLEM
STATEMENT. It is not an adequate starting
point for design, only for the clarifying
process of PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION.
Some of the things which make problem
statements primitive 10 are easy to define,
others not so easy. Some easy ones are:
A problem statement is primitive if YOU
DON'T UNDERSTAND IT. A good problem
statement should be clarifying and self-
explanatory.
A problem statement is primitive if IT
CONTAINS INBUI LT ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT VERIFIABLE MATTERS. A good
problem statement should at least indicate
what could be found out and how important
it might be to find it out.
A problem statement is primitive if IT IS
DESCRIBED IN SOLUTION CONCEPTS.
A good problem statement doesn't give the
answer before it has been devised.
But not so easy are some other concepts
which help us to know the difference between
a primitive problem statement and what
we might term a WELL FORMULATED
PROBLEM STATEMENT. (WFPS). If we
don't know these differences then we a,e
not in a very good position to devise a
WFPS.
What is a Problem?
It was not long ago, at a meeting of the
Society for General Systems Research that
an eminent speaker gave the usual response
to that question. His reply was 'Everything
is a problem' accompanied by a look of
surprise that he should have been asked to
define the situation for which he had, for
the previous half hour, been describing his
solution and how he went about devising
it.
Indeed 'everything' is not a problem;
many things are puzzles and some things
are children. The response is, however,
symptomatic of the readiness of designers in
all fields take the PROBLEM AS GIVEN as
an acceptable starting point.
Rittel9 says 'A problem originates from
a recognised discrepancy between what is
and what-ought-to-be. Any attempt to solve
it consists in the search for removing this
discrepancy' .
This view seems to be reasonable as far as
it goes, and it is consistent with Rittel's view
that designers and others can only identify
problems in terms of solution concepts. We
have already questioned this view (whilst
agreeing that he is probably right for most
practising designers). However, just as this
reality does not necessarily define what is
possible for problem identification, Rittel's
definition of a problem does not define all
design and planning problems. It is perhaps
just because he accepts the false inevitability
of solution concepts that he defines a
problem in terms of them.
The limitations of Rittel's description,
particularly for the complex 'wicked' socio-
technical planning problems to which he
refers, can probably best be illustrated by
two further definitions which we have
formulated.
A problem originates from a discrepancy
between one view of what is and another.
A problem originates from a discrepancy
between one view of what ought to be and
another.
Both of these latter statements seem
far more fundamental to the conditions pre-
vailing today than does Rittel's definition.
He defi nes what is in effect a technical
problem - of HOW to get from point A to
point B where point A is the present and
point B is some preferred future state.
Let us first look at an example of the
problems that confront us in deciding and
agreeing upon what our preferred future state
ought to be. There has for some years been
a policy at national level of increasing the
mobility of the population, in order that a
freer, more dynamic relationship would exist
between employment prospects and work
force. The ability to move house, to
commute, to work away from home and be
easily able to visit, etc., has been fostered in
our national transport policies and systems.
People have become encouraged to be more
cosmopolitan. At the local level this has
often meant that the free flow of commuter
traffic has been given precedenc~ over say,
local needs for parking outside corner shops
and street-fronting houses.
Recently, however, we have heard much
more of the call for 'community spirit'; for
citizensh ip and local pride, possibly as a
reaction to increasing crime and vandalism.
Yet not so long ago thousand upon thousand
of the populations of our cities were com-
pulsorily uprooted and put down in overspill
areas far from where they preferred to live.
The question here is 'ought people
to be cosmopolitan and free travelling, or
ought they to be community based with
local commitments and roots?'. Until one
has made some attempt to choose; or to
establish whether they are or are not
mutually exclusive or to decide on the
balance of needs or preferences, etc., one is
in a poor position for choosing an appropriate
technical solution. For all the recent talk on
'participation'" there is little evidence that
anyone in authority is prepared to allow the
non property-owning public to choose its
own location and life style.
So let us observe, for example, that the
present situation is unsatisfactory in some
way (Definition of 'what is') and that we
wish to do something about it. We may
observe that commuters are getting into
traffic jams and that children in a local
residential street have been knocked down.
If we take the view that mobility is more
important than community in this case, then
we have a basis for resolving the discrepancy
mentioned by Rittel between what is and
what ought to be. However, if we decide
that community is more important than
mobility in that particular case, we have a
completely different basis for resolving the
discrepancy. In terms of solution concepts
one might result in banning parking and
putting up pavement barriers whilst the
other may result in closing the street except
for access by residents.
Now neither of these means of resolving
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275 the discrepancy is really a problem unless itis a technical problem akin to a puzzle.
If we can decide where we are and where we
should be, then we can enjoy working out
how to get there, and we will know when we
arrive.
In many cases, policy disputes seem to
be concerned with wrangling over means,
that is with dispute over the best way of
removing a discrepancy. This is not because
those in dispute have agreed upon what they
are trying to achieve but, on the contrary,
because they have ASSUMED that each has
more or less the same implicit views. One
could find, therefore, in such cases that the
dispute could be traced to a more funda-
mental disagreement about what ought to
be. There are, of course, many situations in
which different views of what ought to be
can be satisfied by a common objective.
Management and Unions may have funda-
mentally differing views about who should
own the means of production, but they may
both agree that each of their goals is best
served at present by getting the men back to
work after a strike. Good design carried out
following good problem-definition would be
better able to seek such classes of solution
in the case of conflicts between interested
parties.
So from this brief description we can
conclude that there are problems inherent
in defining preferred future states. But that
even in the case of apparently irreconcilable
conflicts of view and belief the designer may
well find solutions which bridge the disagree-
ment. There is little chance of him so doing
unless he has identified the nature of the
conflict however. We have also said that
when the desired future state has been
defined, there is likely to be less dispute
over how best to get there. Any remaining
dispute is basically over problems associated
with our limited ability to predict the
effectiveness, efficiency and effects of
using particular technologies and designs
to achieve results within acceptable limits
of risk.
We still live in the Stone Age
But we haven't yet finished. It is easy to see
that people may disagree about what the
future ought to be. It is perhaps less easy to
see that people disagree about what the
present is. This is another deficiency in the
structure of Rittel's definition because one
man's reality isdifferent than another's. What
does a planner see when he visits a slum?
He sees poverty; unhygenic conditions;
damp walls; leaking roofs: and probably
rather pathetic children and perhaps slightly
frightening adults. What does a slum dweller
see when he comes home to a slum? You tell
us, we've never lived in one. How then could
a designer adequately resolve the discrepancy
on behalf of the slum dweller? Not only
does he not know what is important to the
slum dweller, what the situation means or
is, he doesn't know how the slum dweller
sees what ought to be. What usually happens
is that the designer resolves a discrepancy on
behalf of others between how the designer
sees what is and how the designer sees what
ought to be.
In the example discussed this usually
has meant that the designer gives dryness
and hygiene priority because that's what
most offends him about slums. When the
people get into the dry hygenic mass housing
he has devised they sometimes smash it
up and burn the door jambs as firewood.
Many of you may doubt this; it is not
widely publicised by designers or the local
authorities who commission them.
We cannot doubt that mankind has a
greater stock of knowledge, techniques,
technologies and material resources at his
disposal than anyone would have dreamed
even 100 years ago. Man has the power to
build paradise or wipe himself out and even
greater power, over the creation of life, seems
imminent. There seems little doubt that
man can overcome most technical problems,
and provide solutions to certain classes of
problem almost on demand, whilst aborigines
and South American pygmies still live in the
Stone Age. President Kennedy instructed his
designers to land someone for a walk on the
Moon, and they did it within a very short
space of time. We have all sorts of techno-
logical solutions to the transport problem in
cities - moving pavements, bicycles, electric
runabouts, hover monorails, underground
railways, computer controlled taxi-tracks,
horses and carriages, and so on. But in
reality none of them are solutions; they are
technological resources. They are not
solutions because no-one can really define
the problems which they could be drawn
upon to resolve. Man in this, as in so many
other aspects of life, is unable to decide on
what the city ought to be. He doesn't have
to decide it all for cities, but he is unable
even at a local level to decide what a given
city ought to be.
Partly he cannot decide on this because
what a city is is different for the different
people in it. For a petrol station owner the
present transport system is ideal - he
doesn't want it changed because he ha3 a
vested interest in it the way it is. And why
not? Such interests can be identified without
recourse initially to solution concepts. As
discussed earlier, there is considerable value
in avoiding ideas for solution during the
early stages of identifying the problem.
An example of what this means for trans-
port i" the city can be given. One can decide
that the present situation is unsatisfactory
for many reasons: e.g. too many people get
killed; many people don't own cars and the
buses don't run often enough for the rest;
there isn't enough parking space and so on.
All of these are PRIMITIVE PROBLEM
STATEMENTS. One can begin to make
them less primitive by identifying for
whom these th ings are unsatisfactory. Then,
by identifying whether there are some
people for whom they are very satisfactory.
Immediately one can begin to see some of
the dynamics of the situation and what
might happen if you try to change it. Some
people would support change and others
would oppose it. Not because of any given
solution concept, but because they are
inherently satisfied or dissatisfied with the
present state because the city is different
places for each of them. Then you can say
that certain organisations and institutions
would lend power to one side or the other,
not in response to a proposal for a solution
but because they are constituted to protect
certain interests, e.g. the AA would support
motorists.
Birth Control:
A Religious or a Medical Problem?
One would also be able to identify aspects
of the situation which might be differently
easy or difficult to change. For example,
it might be easy to change the direction
of traffic flows, but not the alignment
of streets. But you could not get very
far with some of these things unless you
clarified the basis for your PROPOSED
INTERVENTION in the situation. That is
to say, 'What is the vested interest of the
people who are proposing change, and upon
which aspects do they have the power and
resources to act? The answer to such a
question may be given from the wide base of
a government to the narrower one of a town
council. In either case, however, it is open
for the interested party to ally himself with
others to increase his scope for action.
The recognition of something wrong or
unsatisfactory may take place for all sorts
of reasons, but that recognition does not
necessarily generate a design problem. For a
design problem to exist, some person or
organisation has to decide that they wish
to take action to change the situation which
is unsatisfactory. In order to change it
purposefully, intervention into the situation
has to take place. Here we refer back to
the earlier discussion on objectives and
goals. Purposeful action is goal seeking
action, and goals are sought by people.
We have established that not all people
hold the same goals so some process of
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277 advocacy, of gaining concensus, of theexercise of power, or bargaining has to
take place. The choice of these depends on
circumstance, culture and so on, but in
complex socio-technical situations, which
involve many people by definition, some
way of securing the scope for action is
required.
It is usual that any group will have
primary interests in definable areas, and
will have only certain kinds of power or
influence. Even a national government is so
limited. In these circumstances the potential
for intervention into a situation is also
limited. Firstly, those primary interests
or responsibilities will have the effect of
assigning relative priorities to various aspects
of the situation. Secondly, limitations on
influence and power will make certain aspects
of the situation more or less susceptible to
change by the interested party. Thus for
example, the medical profession is less likely
to be able to change birth control behaviour
by appealing to people's religious convictions
than by offering medical evidence. We
can conclude therefore that for any given
interested party the identification of a
design problem must take account of the
potential for intervention held by the
specific interests and circumstances of
that party.
This view is essentially practical, not
loaded by any particular theories of design
or philosophies of elitism. The question
remains the same: 'What can I do to change
this situation for, what I believe to be, the
better' whether one is asking it is a privileged
design professional, or as a member of a
community self-help group. It is the answer
that changes. In the example given above,
the primitive version of the problem might
make reference to the goal of halting the
population explosion. A well formulated
definition of the problem would be modified
to reflect the interests and influence of
those who wished to act upon the current
situation. Thus the medical profession's
formulation would include observations on
the extent of unwanted pregnancies, various
health risks, rising malnutrition, and so on.
Religious leaders, however, would probably
make reference to the state of morality in
modern youth, the sanctity of marriage, the
soul of the unborn child, etc. These different
interests refer to the same 'problem', and
each may draw upon the other's ground, but
their scope for intervention lies in very
different areas, and the objectives which
they finally set, up would also vary greatly
whE:'1 each defined where and how their
influence could be applied.
The important thing is that both can be
right in their definition of the problem, and
both directions of intervention equally valid.
Problems can only be defined from the view-
points of people affected by them and/or
wishing to affect them. Change in complex
systems comes about through the action
of multiple agencies, and any desire for
comprehensive system-wide control has
great philosophical and political implications
which we won't go into here. Suffice it
to say that the undesirable secondary
characteristics of such a control system
would be likely to far outweigh any increases
in efficiency, productivity, or other quanti-
fiable criteria.
What is a Well Formulated
Problem Statement?
We can conclude now therefore that every
design problem has two roots:
a. The resolution of conflict - the problems
of belief; truth; choice; power; values,
etc.
b. The removal of discrepancy - the
problems of fit; of matching means
with ends; of making up deficiency;
of righting imbalance; etc.
In the same class as the 'discrepancy' view
of the problem is Christopher Alexander's
concept of 'Misfits' between form and
context. He takes the view that design
problems originate from such misfits which
become problems when the extent of the
misfit becomes large enough to have un-
desirable effects on people's comfort,
convenience, etc. As we have said before,
this seems to be true of traditionally defined
design problems and the norms of design
practice, but increasingly our modern
problems are of CHOICE rather than fit.
It has become critical that we learn how
to handle the problems of variety, values
and beliefs, and preference - in short to
find ways of establishing direction. Once we
have done that then the means and the skills
are available to achieve the removal of
virtually any discrepancy between what is
and what ought to be.
If the definition does not seem to cover
the problem of say, road accidents or
pollution, consider that though they seem to
exist not everyone is interested in doing
anything about them. If certain groups
persuade the government that pollution and
road accidents are undesirable, then any
moves to reduce them have to find a balance
between all sorts of factors from economics
to personal freedom.
At this point we can fill in some of the
other ways in which a PRIMITIVE PROB-
LEM STATEMENT can be seen to be
primitive.
Previously we established three criteria of
prim itiveness.
1. Lack of clarity.
2. Unjustified assumptions.
3. Expression in solution concepts.
Now we can add that a problem statement
is primitive if it omits to say:-
4. What the evidence is of the existence of a
problem.
5. For whom it is a problem.
6. Who might support change.
7. Who might oppose change.
8. What are the purposes of intervention.
9. Where might intervention occur.
It can be seen in the list above that
it starts from the observation of those
manifestations which are proving unsatis-
factory, and goes as far as it can - up to
Item 7 - to identify the current prQblem
state. Items 8 and 9 reflect the intent of
some party to take action in the situation
and generate an appraisal of possibilities for
change. Thus one encompasses the realities
of the purpose of those wishing to initiate
change; using this both as a meansof limiting
the boundaries of the problem, and as a
means of defining central intent, or the
focus of action. It is only after this has been
done that one can begin to analyse the
situation and model it effectively.
What this does it to postpone the use of
solution concepts for as long as possible in
order to increase the likelihood that the
many facets of the problem may be allowed
to influence the final attempts at solution.
The view of the problem is kept fluid and
broad and insights sought which will give the
best chance of providing the essentially
varied base for problem solving in complex
socio-technical situations.
In the end it has to be realised that in such
problems it is the preferences, intentions and
desires of man which have to draw the
boundaries. What more natural than that
you go as far as you can with the resources
available; that the core of the problem
reflects your interest in it and that the
degree to which your intentions prove dis-
advantageous to others will determ ine the
resistance you expereince. We should not
find ourselves dismayed by such arbitrary
constraints, but rather feel that it is they
which ensure the humanity of the man-made
world for mankind.
In past ages, and perhaps in some places
now, where change was so slow as to be
almost imperceptible, the context was
closely woven into habit, tradition, custom
and bel ief. Inti mes of rapid change, however,
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279 when everyone is disorientated, when valuesare turned about and conflicts and stress
abound, the context of design activity is
uncertain and the parameters of form are
unknown. It is these circumstances which
generate .the need for an explicit process of
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION - a process
whose purpose can be defined as THE
DEFINITION OF SOLUTION CONTEXT.
1. The terms 'Problem Push' and 'Solution Pull'
are not original to the present authors.
However, we cannot at present trace their
origin, and apologies to whoever we are failing
to acknowledge.
2. Some elaboration of this point may be found
in JO:les, J.C. 1970. Design Methods. (John
Wiley & Sons),
and in
Archer, L. Bruce. 1971. Technological Inno-
vation. (Science Policy Foundation).
3. (a) Rittel, Horst, W.B. & Webber, Melvin M.
1971. Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning. DMG - DRS Journal. Vo1.8,
No.1. Jan. - Mar. 1974. (Reprinted
from Policy Sciences, VolA, No.2.
Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co.,
Amsterdam).
(b) Rittel, Horst. 1970. Some Principles for
the Design of an Educational System for
Design. DMG - DRS Journal, Vol.7,
No.2. Apr. - June 1973. (Reprinted
from past DMG Newsletters - Dec. 1970
& Jan. 19711.
4. Another version of this viewpoint can be
found in Singleton, W.I. 1974. Man-Machine
Systems, Penguin Education (Penguin Books),
particularly on page 30 'I n particular it is
necessary to separate the functional concept
of a system from its physical realisation; that
is, to contemplate what it does as an issue
quite separate from how it does it physically'.
5. As reference 3(a).
6. Further reading on the subject of the use
of explicit objectives in the allocation of
resources and decision making in complex
situations can be found in Williams, Alan
Cost-benefit Analysis: Bastard Science?
And/or Insidious Poison in the Body Politick?
in Wolfe, J.N. 1973. Cost Benefit and Cost
Effectiveness. (George Allen & Unwin).
7. Winchester, Simon They've come a long way
in St Louis. Guardian Extra Wednesday May
15th, 1974.
8. de Bono, Edward, 1967. The five-day course
in lateral thinking. (Pelican Books 1969) and
other books by de Bono.
9. As reference 3(b) but further elaborated in
3(a).
10. Asimov, M. 1962 Introduction to Design
(Prentice-Hall, N.J.) says 'We assume that we
have been given a primitive statement of
needs. By primitive we mean that the
statement represents opinions based mainly
on casual observations but unsupported by
organised evidence'.
11. For example in Cross, M.G. (Ed.), 1972
Design Participation. Proceedings of the
DRS Conference, Manchester 1971. (Academy
Edition, London).
1. Most people make
the assumption that
they are unable to go
outisde an imaginary
line joining the outer
dots.
2. ather the matchsticks tightly together and
look at them end-<ln. Most people lay them
down and try to use the matchsticks as sides of
squares, then give up.
